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Chopped to Pieces,
I Write Myself Together
Abstract
In this paper, the author reflects on being a writer in the academy in dialogue 
with writers who have been instrumental in the author’s academic work: James 
Baldwin, George Orwell, Eduardo Galeano, and Michel Foucault. The author 
first contextualizes the paper in the current historical moment, characterized by 
resurgent authoritarianism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and mass non-violent pro-
tests in response to the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor to 
reiterate the importance of academic writers as public intellectuals. The author 
then reflects on the messy affects of writing in the academy, particularly as a 
pre-tenure faculty member, through four purposes, proposed by Orwell, that mo-
tivate most writers: sheer egoism, an aesthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse, 
and political purpose. The author concludes that academic writing comprises an 
aesthetics and ethics of the self as well as a political project of self-cultivation, 
the embodiment of truth, and care for the world.
Keywords: academic writing; technologies of the self; parrhēsia; aesthetics; art 
of living
Introduction
Why does one write, if not to put one’s pieces together? From the moment we en-
ter school or church, education chops us into pieces: it teaches us to divorce soul 
from body and mind from heart. The fishermen of the Columbian coast must be 
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learned doctors of ethics and morality, for they invented the word sentipensante, 
feeling-thinking, to define language that speaks the truth. (Galeano, 1992, p. 121)
 When I submitted the first draft of this article in the late summer of 2019, the 
world seemed different. Discourses of temporal difference, may, however, obfus-
cate or disavow the underlying conditions of possibility of the present. One year 
later, the systemic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and mass protests sparked 
by the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor have rendered a myr-
iad of preexisting historic injustices even more grotesquely visible. My hope in 
these times, perhaps best expressed by Baldwin (1965/1998) through his prophet-
ic writings on U.S. race relations, is that the crises we confront will illuminate 
the history on which many white people find themselves “impaled…incapable 
of seeing or changing themselves, or the world” (p. 723). In terms of education, 
specifically academic writing, the historicization of oneself and the world in a 
stubbornly ahistoric socio-political milieu (Pinar, 2012) resonates with a funda-
mental tenet of curriculum theory: self and social reconstruction.
 Academics currently live, work, teach, and write in, and against, an era char-
acterized by resurgent authoritarianism, economic precarity, a cult of irrational-
ism and hypermasculine violence, and impending environmental collapse. Glob-
ally, I see Eco’s (2001) Ur-Fascism,1 an ever-present set of characteristics, around 
any one of which a “Fascist nebula will begin to coagulate” (p. 78), in operation. 
From post-truth propaganda to intolerance of dissent and academic inquiry—for 
example, attacks on gender studies (American Association of University Profes-
sors, 2018)—the academy faces some significant, perhaps existential challenges 
in the United States and globally.
 Considering the importance of academic writing to the health of intellectual 
life, itself precarious in a society historically suspicious of intellectuals and driven 
by the practical social engineering demands of the business-minded (Hofstadter, 
1962; Pinar, 2006), the question of what it means to be a writer in the academy, 
while always important, assumes greater urgency. Much as the COVID pandemic 
has magnified numerous institutional disparities, the responses of many universities 
to COVID have illuminated the academy’s complicity with the neoliberal project. 
What might a disaster capitalist (Klein, 2007) response by university administrators 
and governing boards to the COVID pandemic mean for writing as an expression of 
humanist inquiry and the embodiment of ethics of justice? As a pre-tenure faculty 
member, I often struggle with the tensions inherent in the technocratic obsession 
with metrics that purport to assign a market value to my scholarly worth. I fear that 
the increasingly gigified nature of the material conditions of academic work is fur-
ther eroding already weakened principles of academic freedom, shared governance, 
and what remains of institutional commitments to writing as a political practice 
using, as Galeano (1992) suggests, language that speaks the truth.
 In this essay, I engage with the messy affects of writing in the academy by 
grappling with a fundamental question: why and for whom do I write? I structure 
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my inquiry around four general motives—sheer egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm, his-
torical impulse, and political purpose—which Orwell (1946/2005) suggests drive 
all writers in varying degrees according to the times in which they live. Framing 
this essay in Orwell’s (1946/2005) analysis of writers’ purposes and motivations, 
I place myself in dialogue with Orwell, James Baldwin, and Michel Foucault. 
These writers, each in their own way, discuss writing as a political, aesthetic, and 
moral practice, a way of being in the world deeply entangled with the subjective 
and the social, and an ethical commitment to seek and embody truth. Based on my 
engagement with Orwell, Baldwin, and Foucault, whose work has influenced my 
own, I understand writing as an art of self-cultivation in relationship with others 
through which I situate myself historically, socially, and politically and act on my 
emerging self-understanding toward reconstruction of the social world. I begin 
with Orwell’s (1946/2005) first motive, sheer egoism.
Sheer Egoism
 Writers, Baldwin (1993) notes, “are said to be extremely egotistical and 
demanding” and their work, while they remain alive, “fatally entangled” with 
their personal fortunes and misfortunes, personalities, and the “social facts and 
attitudes” of their time (p. 182). For Baldwin (1993), the social facts and atti-
tudes that inhere in his work revolve around “the question of color,” which, in the 
United States, “operates to hide the graver questions of the self” (p. xiii). Orwell 
(1946/2005) attributes writers’ egoism to their “desire to seem clever, to be talked 
about, and to be remembered after death,” and he dismissed as “humbug” any 
pretension that egoism isn’t a strong motivation to write (p. 4). He also suggests 
that serious writers comprise a “minority of gifted, willful people who are deter-
mined to live their own lives to the end” whereas many people tend to “abandon 
individual ambition” and succumb to the drudgery of living for others (Orwell, 
1946/2005, p. 5). Both Baldwin (1993) and Orwell (1946/2005) imply that writers 
live in an egoistic paradox, which emerges from several conflicting, and perhaps 
generative, desires: to be immersed in their own subjectivities; to be affirmed 
by others; to attain immortality through being discussed, remembered, and even 
studied by others long after death; to live their own lives; and to embody truth as 
a moral practice.
 The tensions and contradictions inherent in the writer’s egoistic paradox 
flourish in the academy, which deftly plays to the professorial ego using both 
enticements and “subtle tactics of the sanction” (Foucault, 2015, p. 6)—promo-
tion, tenure, merit pay, statistical hierarchization and differentiation—to leverage 
the production of specific scholarly subjectivities. I also sense a contradiction 
between the pretense of the academic pursuit of truth and post-truth discourses 
that resemble “Newspeak” (Orwell, 1949), the goal of which is to “limit the in-
struments available to complex and critical reasoning” (Eco, 2001, p. 86). Con-
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sidering those contradictions, my integrity as a writer must, as Pinar (2006) sug-
gests, include introspection into myself and principled critique of the institutions 
through which I move and of my own academic field.
 Which brings me to the other side of the egoistic paradox: the importance of 
subjectivity to my ontology of writing. Interiority is a crucial thread through Bald-
win’s work, which he characterizes as a “state of being alone” (1962/1998, p. 669). 
For a writer, the state of being alone is “not meant to bring to mind merely a rustic 
musing beside some silver lake” (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 669). Rather, the alone-
ness of a writer is a state in which one contemplates truly existential questions:
The aloneness of which I speak is much more like the fearful aloneness of birth 
or death…. The states of birth, suffering, love, and death are extreme states: 
extreme, universal, and inescapable. We all know this, but we would rather not 
know it. The artist is present to correct the delusions to which we fall prey in our 
attempts to avoid this knowledge. (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 669)
As a writer in the academy, I feel great resonance with the state of aloneness 
described by Baldwin (1962/1998) as a politics of writing that troubles the in-
transigence of common sense, which so often reinscribes the injustices of the past 
onto the present.
 Indeed, Foucault (2005) characterizes self-care as a conversion to self, a 
form of return that he explains through the metaphor of navigation, or a journey. 
The cultivation of self-knowledge is a technology of the self, a “privilege-duty, a 
gift-obligation that ensures our freedom while forcing us to take ourselves as the 
object of all our diligence” (Foucault, 1984/1988, p. 47). Thus, the ancient art of 
living associates care of one’s body with the care of one’s soul through self-exam-
ination of the principles inherent in the activities that one embodies, particularly 
writing. Foucault (quoted in Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988) describes a herme-
neutics of technologies of the self, which function in conflict with technologies of 
production, sign systems, and power, as practices that
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a cer-
tain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (p. 18)
Writing, therefore, is a constant, complex “activity of speaking and writing in 
which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others” are linked 
into “a true social practice” (Foucault, 1984/1988, p. 51), which forms a “system 
of reciprocal obligations” (p. 54). During the Hellenistic era, writing became an 
essential technology of the self that included “taking notes on oneself to be reread, 
writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in 
order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed” (Foucault quoted in Martin 
et al., 1988, p. 27). Unlike the renunciation of the self that characterized Christian 
asceticism, classical philosophy privileged “the progressive consideration of the 
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self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but 
through the acquisition and assimilation of truth” (Foucault quoted in Martin et 
al., 1988, p. 35). For me, academic writing, emerges from an ancient, complex set 
of practices associated with the art of living through which we care for, cultivate, 
and come to know ourselves both in solitude and with the guidance of others.
 I often wonder if writing as a social practice is in danger of disappearing. It 
is possible, absent the context of his broad body of work, to misinterpret Orwell’s 
(1946/2005) suggestion that writers are motivated partially by sheer egoism and 
dismiss writing, and writers, as the windows through which we see and are seen. 
Considering the systems of governmentality formed by the “contact between 
technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Foucault quoted in 
Martin et al., 1988, p. 19), I have developed a deeper appreciation for writing as a 
social practice of self-cultivation based on a system of reciprocal obligations. The 
complexities of subjectivity connect with Orwell’s (1946/2005) second motive to 
write, aesthetic enthusiasm, which signifies writing as an artform entangled with 
an aesthetics of the self. 
Aesthetic Enthusiasm
 The return to the self through the act of writing signals writing as an ethics 
and aesthetics of the self, which transcends superficial contemporary expressions 
of self-help, authenticity, and “getting back to oneself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 251). 
The sense of writing as an aesthetic practice was perhaps best exemplified during 
the Hellenistic Age when “writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed to corre-
spondence,” and care for oneself “became linked to a constant writing activity” 
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 27). It is that sense of writing that 
Foucault (2005) suggests has remained elusive in the modern era despite efforts 
to revive it. Part of writing as an aesthetics of the self lies in the pleasure derived 
from the intimacy of writing as a social practice, particularly the relationship “be-
tween the care of the self and philosophical love, or the relation to the master” 
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 26), which revealed the ars erotica 
imbricated with the cultivation of the self through writing. For example, Marcus 
Aurelius, in a letter from 144-45 CE to his master, Fronto, described his activities, 
health, mood, and conscience during a rural retreat to put Aurelius “in contact” 
with himself, and he expressed his love for Fronto in closing (Foucault quoted in 
Martin et al., 1988, p. 29).
 Similarly, Baldwin (1993) discusses the aesthetics of writing as a continuous 
practice of self-examination:
I still believe that the unexamined life is not worth living: and I know that self-de-
lusion, in the service of no matter what small or lofty cause, is a price no writer can 
afford. His subject is himself and the world and it requires every ounce of stamina 
he can summon to attempt to look on himself and the world as they are. (p. xii)
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The necessity for a writer to live an examined life resonates with the sense of writ-
ing as an aesthetics of the self and Baldwin’s (1962/1998) characterization of the 
writer as “that incorrigible disturber of the peace” (p. 669) with whom all societies 
have historically battled. Much as Foucault (2008) suggests that civil society is 
a governmental technology predicated on economic logics, Baldwin (1962/1998) 
portrays the purpose of society as maintaining order and habituating the people 
to traditions from which they derive their identity and, thus, governability. The 
writer’s responsibility to society, and writing as an aesthetic act, is to “never cease 
warring with” society, for society’s sake and for the sake of the writer (Baldwin, 
1962/1998, p. 670).
 Aesthetic enthusiasm, for Orwell (1946/2005), can reflect the “perception of 
beauty in the external world”; “pleasure in the impact of one sound on another, 
in the firmness of good prose or the rhythm of a good story”; and the “desire 
to share an experience which one feels is valuable and ought not to be missed” 
(Orwell, 1946/2005, p. 5). Importantly, Orwell (1946/2005) expressed the goal of 
his political writing as the elevation of “political writing into an art form,” and 
he could not write “if it were not also an aesthetic experience” in which he took 
pleasure (p. 8). Thus, as an aesthetic practice, writing, by seeking a more complex 
understanding of personal and social history, can reveal the beauty of the world. 
Foucault (2003) might characterize the revelatory power of writing as genealogi-
cal inquiry that can uncover knowledges and traditions that have been eliminated 
from academic institutions as unsophisticated, non-erudite, and inconvenient to 
partial, yet totalizing white Western narratives. Baldwin (1962/1998) similarly 
embodies a politics of writing through which the aesthetic experience of writing 
helps one discover “that life is tragic, and, therefore, unutterably beautiful” (p. 
671). Through my own writing, I have learned that beauty can exist in the tragedy 
of the truth, specifically in the stories of resistance and counter-conduct that we 
can uncover through our academic work. Further, part of the beauty of writing 
lies, paradoxically, in the willingness to speak the truth about ourselves, which is 
typically “at variance with what we wish to be” (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 671).
 Writing as an aesthetic practice integral to the art of living, thus, forms a 
“whole field of experience” including detailed introspection and the development 
of a relationship “between writing and vigilance” in which one pays attention to 
the “nuances of life” (Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 28). Care of the 
self and the art of living are intertwined in a relationship to the self that is simul-
taneously imbricated with the presence of others who help us situate ourselves in 
the world and provoke us to act ethically (Foucault, 2005). The aesthetic impulse 
that I seek to cultivate transcends the superficial, commercialized sense of “find-
ing myself” or accumulating a “bucket list” of pleasurable experiences and their 
associated artifacts. I do not seek to use writing instrumentally to quantify my 
worth to “the field” as an academic writer. Rather, I am attempting to embody an 
aesthetics of the self as an ethic of self-care and self-cultivation through a practice 
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of writing not merely for others, but in relationship with others who can guide me 
toward ethical action in the world. The practice of writing is an act of vigilance, 
of attending to myself as an ethics of caring for others and the world, which is 
entangled with an impulse to situate myself historically, to which I now turn.
Historical Impulse
 To enact an ethics of the self requires an understanding of oneself in the 
context of history. One of the tragedies associated with times like those in which 
we currently live is the historic inability to transcend such times. Instead, the 
discursive lack of historicality often results in the reinscription of the past on 
the present and the future. For example, present phenomena such as post-truth, 
authoritarianism, and police violence against persons of color emerge from ex-
tensive intersected histories. Yet, an ahistoric presentism often afflicts social, po-
litical, and educational discourses, which reduces the complexities of the present 
to a “flattened never-ending ‘now’” (Pinar, 2012, p. 227). Baldwin (1965/1998) 
reminds us, however, that history
does not refer merely, or even principally, to the past. On the contrary, the great 
force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are unconsciously 
controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we do. 
It could scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames of 
reference, our identities and our aspirations. (p. 723)
Thus, we can see the disavowal of the history white supremacy in discourses 
from “all lives matter” and “personal responsibility” to the devotion of many to 
neo-Confederate iconography, which purports that symbols such as the Confed-
erate flag and statues of Confederate leaders are monuments to cultural heritage 
rather than to slavery and white ethnonationalism. In contrast to historical dis-
avowal, Baldwin (1993) suggests that the aesthetic endeavor of an examined life 
requires a willingness “to free ourselves of the myth of America” (p. 11), a diffi-
cult task in a country that distrusts intellectuals precisely because they threaten to 
complicate or destroy that myth.
 Orwell’s (1946/2005) historical impulse to write, and his political purpose, 
were contextualized in his experiences with British colonialism, fighting against 
Fascism in Spain, the aftermath of World War II, and the emerging Cold War. He 
wrote not to catalog facts and events, but to reconcile his “ingrained likes and dis-
likes with the essentially public, non-individual activities” that each age forces on 
all of humanity (p. 9). Orwell (1946/2005) also considered his historical impulse 
to write imbricated with the “construction of language,” which raised, for him, the 
“problem of truthfulness” (p. 9). Thus, Orwell’s (1949) “Newspeak” illuminated 
the danger of post-truth politics more than four decades before playwright Steve 
Tesich coined the term “post-truth” in 1992.
 My scholarly interest in the effects of technologies of institutional power an-
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imates my historical impulse to write. Foucault’s (2003) method and tactic of 
genealogy has, therefore, inspired my politics of writing over the years. Gene-
alogy couples “scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to con-
stitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in 
contemporary tactics” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8). I have found genealogy crucial to 
my understanding of the production of knowledges that effect power, and also to 
excavate local knowledges—“what people know” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8)—which 
have been institutionally subjugated. The pursuit of writing as an aesthetic genea-
logical project in search of a more complex, truthful understanding of the present 
requires, as Baldwin (1993) suggests, questioning tradition. Genealogy as a meth-
od and a historical and political project illuminates the conditions of possibility 
that produce the present, which can help us see, as Orwell (1946/2005) suggests, 
not only things as they really are, but how the present came to be. Excavating dif-
ferent voices, knowledges, and memories resonates with an aesthetics of the self 
and may, as Baldwin (1965/1998) concludes, assess how history has subjective-
ly formed us and recreate ourselves “according to a principle more humane and 
more liberating” (p. 723). Through such a project, which is inherently political, 
we might, in the language of curriculum theory, reconstruct ourselves and contrib-
ute to historical change.
Political Purpose
 We live, as Orwell (1946/2005) described his own time, in a “tumultuous, rev-
olutionary age” (p. 4). At the very least, the current times have the potential to 
become such an age, hopefully in pursuit of a truly just society. Taken together, 
Orwell’s (1946/2005) four impulses to write, sheer egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm, 
historical impulse, and political purpose, “must war against one another” and “fluc-
tuate from person to person and from time to time” (p. 6). As a police officer in 
Burma, Orwell developed a hatred of imperialism; his impoverishment evoked his 
awareness of class struggle; and the rise of Hitler, participation in the resistance 
during the Spanish Civil War, and the Soviet counter-revolution illuminated the 
threat of totalitarianism. The times during which Orwell (1946/2005) lived impelled 
him to write for a political purpose, and he concluded: “It seems to me nonsense, in 
a period like our own, to think that one can avoid writing of such subjects” (p. 8). To 
avoid confronting the existential crises we currently face would be to abdicate my 
ethical and political responsibility as a public intellectual to others.
 Baldwin’s vast political project dealt with myriad aspects of race relations, 
both internationally and in the United States, a particularly interesting aspect of 
which was the complex relationship between the North and the South. His obser-
vation about race as an entanglement of power and sex (Baldwin, 1993), an overt 
reference to lynching and rape as a technology of domination, are as relevant to-
day as ever. That observation reflects Baldwin’s (1993) own genealogical thinking 
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through which present issues—police terror against communities of color; health, 
educational, and housing discrimination; economic dispossession; mass incarcer-
ation; misogyny; and the epidemic of violence perpetrated against Black Trans 
Women—emerged through technologies of power, including the persistence of 
academic discourses that sought to scientifically rationalize racial hierarchies 
(see Foucault, 1970/1994). Baldwin’s (1993) politics of writing further extends 
to the “extremely dangerous luxury” in which Northern white people indulge: 
the illusion that “because they fought on the right side during the Civil War, and 
won, they have earned the right merely to deplore what is going on in the South” 
(p. 69). That political observation was also expressed by Martin Luther King, 
Junior’s (1963/2000) disappointment with the white moderate “more devoted to 
‘order’ than to justice” (p. 96). That critique remains pertinent today, particularly 
among elite establishment liberals who continue to deplore police violence and 
racism but engage in purely performative acts in support of racial justice.
 To summarize the politics of writing that inspires me, I return to Foucault 
(quoted in Martin et al., 1988), who noted the Hellenistic linkage between writ-
ing as self-care and political activity. One tension that emerges from writing as 
a technology of the self and political activity centers on the question: “When is 
it better to turn away from political activity and concern oneself with oneself?” 
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 26). As a pre-tenure faculty member, I 
do sometimes struggle to balance my political engagement with the need to return 
to and care for myself so that I can continue meaningful engagement in the world. 
Thus, writing for me is both a journey of engagement and a return to myself.
 Foucault (2011) also speaks of a parrhēsiastic ethics of truth telling as self-care 
through writing in which “the self is something to write about, a theme or object 
(subject) of writing activity” (Foucault, quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 27). Par-
ticularly in the current historical moment, I am concerned about the manipulation 
of language to obfuscate and dehistoricize rather than reveal truth. To embody the 
courage of truth as a parrhēsiastic practice, one must speak truth “without conceal-
ment, reserve, empty manner of speech, or rhetorical ornament which might encode 
or hide it” (Foucault, 2011, p. 10). One is also bound to the consequences of one’s 
speech, which reflects the risks inherent in speaking and seeking truth, such as an-
gering others, learning that one’s beliefs are untrue, and even physical or political 
death. Parrhēsia is, therefore, a “way of being which is akin to a virtue, a mode of 
action” (Foucault, 2011, p. 25) rather than rhetorical techniques that conceal mean-
ing. As a technology of the self, parrhēsia privileges the importance of others as 
interlocutors who can help guide one toward a better understand oneself, others, and 
the world. Writing for the political purpose of seeking truth helps situate oneself in 
and connect with the world, impels one to action, and establishes limits on one’s 
actions (Foucault, 2005). I view my interlocutors in the parrhēsiastic “game” as my 
guides, the ones to whom I write, and the ones who impel me to reckon with myself 
(Foucault, 2005). Ultimately, I write, as Galeano (1989) suggests, for myself, as a 
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technology and aesthetics of the self, and a historical and political project through 
which I write for others as well.
Concluding Thoughts
 The question “What are we today?” introduced Foucault’s (quoted in Martin 
et al., 1988) emerging line of inquiry into the modern political rationality that 
seeks to mediate the tensions between increasing individuation and the reinforce-
ment of the totality of the state, between the “social entity and the individual” 
(p. 153). The political technology of individuals—biopolitics—emerges from the 
reason of the modern nation-state, the paradox of which lies in the coexistence 
of “large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of in-
dividual life” (Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 147). The biopolitical 
rationality endemic in the police powers of the modern state focuses solely on 
the perpetuation of nation-states concerned with individuals only insofar as they 
have some productive utility. Thus, states aggregate individuals into populations, 
which is “nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake” (Fou-
cault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 160).
 How does any of this relate to the messy affect(s) of writing in the academy? 
Political technologies of individuation function in all the institutions that comprise 
the modern state through extractive logics that render individuals objects of inquiry 
to produce knowledges that form useful self-governing subjects. Biopolitics is also 
a crucial analytical lens for my research, particularly the militarization of the carcer-
al state, creeping fascism, white ethnonationalist violence, and increasingly onerous 
technologies of surveillance and propaganda. Importantly, I am interested in both 
sides of the biopolitical coin. The power of the nation-state, and all its institutions, 
including the academy, to foster life coexists with the power to disallow life, which 
Foucault (quoted in Martin et al., 1988) calls thanatopolitics. Concerning academ-
ic work, the logics of neoliberalism to which academic institutions have largely 
succumbed operate according to the same biopolitical rationality that concerned 
Foucault. For example, sophisticated data-driven technologies function as a form 
of police power to chop individuals into increasingly minute pieces of data and ei-
ther foster or disallow their existence based on their quantifiable institutional utility. 
Inherent in the politics of individuals is the politics of life and death, a frightening 
prospect considering the last century of human history. 
 On the other hand, I wonder what one of Foucault’s famous strategic rever-
sals might look like in the academy and in a biopolitical society. How might we 
reverse the biopolitical rationality that forms and fosters a reductive subjectivity 
based on the utility of individuals to institutions? How might we as writers in 
the academy embrace writing as an aesthetic practice of self-care animated by 
a parrhēsiastic ethic, which might subvert the extractive logics inherent in the 
academy, and society? I have no firm answers to those questions, but reflecting 
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constantly on the politics of writing, I believe, is essential to the work of academics 
as public intellectuals. Although the authors with whom I engaged in this paper 
emerged from different subjective positions, they all regarded writing as an aesthet-
ic, ethical, and political act of authoring themselves. Writing, from that perspective, 
is more than sine qua non to the academy. Writing is also sine qua non to the art of 
living.
Note
 1 Eco’s characteristics of Ur-Fascism include: the cult of tradition; a rejection of mod-
ernism; irrationalism; intolerance of dissent; fear of difference; authoritarian populist ap-
peals to the frustrated; an obsession with conspiracies, particularly regarding outsiders; a 
propagandized humiliation at the hands of outsiders; glorification of permanent war; scorn 
for the weak; the cult of death; transferring the will to power to sexual questions; the rejec-
tion of democracy; and the use of “Newspeak” to circumvent critical thought.
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